

RESEARCH REPORT

# **TRIBAL NETWORKS AND INFORMAL ADAPTIVE MECHANISMS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES**

**THE CASE OF THE BANI KHALID TRIBE  
IN JORDAN, SYRIA AND LEBANON**

*Päivi Miettunen*

*Mohammed Shunnaq*



Issam Fares Institute for Public  
Policy and International Affairs  
معهد عصام فارس للسياسات  
العامة والشؤون الدولية

Beirut, January 2020 © All Rights Reserved.

This case study was conducted as part of a project titled, “Informal adaptive mechanisms among refugees in the Middle East: Understanding adaptation, resilience and agency in securing livelihoods in the informal economy among refugees from Syria in Lebanon and Jordan”, and was made possible through a grant from the Ford Foundation.

The project was coordinated by Nasser Yassin (Principal Investigator), Maysa Baroud (Project Coordinator), and Yara Mourad (Program Manager) of the Refugee Research and Policy Program at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs.

The report is published by the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI) at the American University of Beirut (AUB). It can be obtained from IFI or can be downloaded from the following website: <http://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi>

The views expressed in this document are solely those of the authors, and do not reflect the views of the Ford Foundation, the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, or the American University of Beirut.

This report or any portion thereof may not be reproduced or used in any manner whatsoever without the express written permission of the publisher except for the use of brief quotations.

 Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut (AUB)  
Issam Fares Institute Building (Facing the Green Oval)

 PO Box 11-0236, Riad El-Solh, Beirut 1107 2020, Lebanon

 +961-1-350000 Ext. 4150

 +961-1-737627

 [ifi.comms@aub.edu.lb](mailto:ifi.comms@aub.edu.lb)

 [www.aub.edu.lb/ifi](http://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi)

 [aub.ifi](https://www.facebook.com/aub.ifi)

 [@ifi\\_aub](https://twitter.com/ifi_aub)

# ***TRIBAL NETWORKS AND INFORMAL ADAPTIVE MECHANISMS OF SYRIAN REFUGEES***

***THE CASE OF THE BANI KHALID TRIBE  
IN JORDAN, SYRIA AND LEBANON***

**Päivi Miettunen, University of Helsinki, Finland**

**Mohammed Shunnaq, Yarmouk University, Jordan**



# **CONTENTS**

<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>6</b>
OBJECTIVES	6
THEORETICAL FRAME AND METHODOLOGY	6
OBSTACLES AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	8
<b>CONTEXT</b>	<b>9</b>
WADI KHALID	9
JORDAN	10
<b>RESULTS: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES SINCE 2011</b>	<b>11</b>
ENTREPRENEURSHIP	13
SEASONAL WORK	14
<b>THE CASE OF TRIBAL WOMEN</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>APPENDIX A: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF TRIBAL COMMUNITIES</b>	<b>22</b>
JORDAN	23
SYRIA	24
LEBANON	25
<b>APPENDIX B: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS IN JORDAN</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>APPENDIX C: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS IN LEBANON</b>	<b>29</b>

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This project focuses on tribal networks and tribal relations of the Bani Khalid tribe in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and analyzes how these networks are part of informal adaptive mechanisms of the refugees.

Bani Khalid is one of the large Bedouin tribes that has expanded throughout the Middle East: from Saudi Arabia to Iraq, Syria and Jordan among others. In the beginning of the 20th century, several subtribes of Bani Khalid migrated annually through the northern Badia, but following the establishment of the modern states, newly made borders divided them. Despite this, the tribal ties have remained strong, with frequent and active communications across the borders.

In Jordan, several villages located around the city of Mafraq belong to the tribe, among them Hamra, Howsha, Zaatari and Khaldiya. A larger migration to Jordan took place in the 1980's when several families from Syria settled in the village of Zaatari. The most recent migration was caused by the war in Syria, resulting in the members of the tribe fleeing across the borders.

Even though the Zaatari refugee camp is located nearby, Syrian members of the Bani Khalid are mostly living in the villages of their tribe, especially Zaatari. They have been utilizing the *kafala* system (sponsorship system), in which a Jordanian citizen has the possibility to act as a "sponsor", allowing the refugee to stay outside camps. These individuals and families are staying with Jordanian families or living on land owned by the Jordanian members of the tribe. While many of the Syrian-origin Bani Khalid have been able to start small businesses and support themselves, there are also many less fortunate people, especially widows and people with health issues, who mostly rely on charity and support from others. As the war in Syria continues, forcing people to remain uprooted, dependency, kinship, and traditional laws of hospitality among the Bedouin are all shaping and reshaping the relationships between Syrian and Jordanian Bani Khalid.

The historical tribal territories extended to the area of modern Lebanon, with families spending part of their annual cycle in the northern parts of the Bekaa Valley. When the modern state of Lebanon was established,

some families remained in the country. However, the socioeconomic status of the Bedouin in Lebanon has been relatively low, resulting in marginalization and poverty. Because of this, and because of the small number of Bani Khalid in the country, the Lebanese members of the tribe have less means to provide aid and support to their tribal kin fleeing from Syria. Despite this, not all the Bani Khalid leaving Syria have chosen to settle in Jordan. Before the war, many members of the tribe worked seasonally in the farms and businesses in Lebanon, while their families stayed in Syria, tending to their own farms and cattle. The war forced whole families to migrate and stay in Lebanon permanently. In many cases, these groups were able to utilize their established, work-related contacts in the country. Overall, Lebanon and Jordan have applied very different approaches to the refugee issue. Despite this, the coping and survival strategies of the Bani Khalid refugees share many similar characteristics.

This report is the result of a comparative study of the differences and similarities of the importance and limits of the tribal networks in informal economies of the refugees in Lebanon and Jordan. We argue that these structures of kinship, tribal traditions and sense of identity can to a certain degree support the adaptation of refugees of tribal origin. The informal mechanisms long utilized in the background and in addition to formal state structures by tribal communities in the three countries provide a framework – a shared knowledge – that is familiar to the members of different tribes. This familiarity, in turn, helps in coping and provides agency when facing new situations. We believe that institutions working with refugees of tribal origin should have an understanding about the tribal systems, networks and past developments. We have therefore provided some basic information concerning these topics in this report.

## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

FSA	Free Syrian Army
HHI	Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
NGO	Non-governmental organization
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

# INTRODUCTION

## Objectives

The main question is: what is the role of tribal networks in the various stages of immigration of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, and how is it negotiated for protection, aid and finding livelihood? We will map the social, economic and political networks of the Bani Khalid tribe and study how these networks were maintained across the borders before the war. After this, we will analyze how the tribal relations and networks were reinforced, altered and adapted from 2011 onwards to protect the refugees, secure their livelihoods and enhance their resilience. Special attention is given to the following topics:

- ▶ What are the concrete steps the refugees take to secure their livelihood in the new country? (e.g., building a small business, finding seasonal work). To what extent do they utilize the tribal relations in this process?
- ▶ How are various conflicting issues being managed and resolved within the tribe? Such issues include differing values and ideals (e.g., education of girls), economic dependency and exploitation, political and/or sectarian affiliations, and criminal activities (e.g., smuggling, drug trade).
- ▶ What kind of relationship does the tribe have with formal authorities? Is there any cooperation between the tribe and state/non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in helping and protecting the refugees, or do the members of the tribe prefer to solve issues within the community?

Women and girls are among the most vulnerable among the refugees. In traditional tribal community, low levels of education, limited possibilities to work outside home, and lack skills needed for working make the situation difficult for women. In Syria, the traditional Bedouin communities have not favored the education of girls, but in Jordan, an increasing number of females are pursuing university degrees and even working outside the home. How then, does the different focus on a woman's education and career affect the views and practices of Bedouin refugees? What kind of help and support are the Jordanian/Lebanese Bedouin women offering to the Syrian women arriving as refugees into their community?

## Theoretical frame and methodology

The social identity theory, developed by Tajfel in the 1970's, is a central theory in the study of group processes and intergroup relations. Tajfel (1981, 255) defines social identity as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership". Individuals are categorized based on the group they are thought to belong to, thus leading to in-group members being favored over those in other groups. The group becomes the defining element in an individual's identity, seen as distinctive from other groups, and the group's shared practices, traditions and knowledge are valued positively.

The striving for positive self-concept is a major motivator, also in individual action. The intergroup relations make up the underlying mechanisms through which the individuals within the community seek livelihood, build resilience and show agency. The positive attitude towards one's own group strengthens an individual's self-esteem, and the familiar structures they have been utilizing for a long time give them means to adapt to new situations also in times of crisis, providing tools and informal networks for coping.

We consider *knowledge and information* the central elements in understanding informal adaptive mechanisms of the refugees. Whether the question is about finding a job, establishing new businesses, education, housing, healthcare and other services, finding and sharing information is essential in all levels of the process. Without relevant information, adaptation and securing livelihoods in a new environment is impossible. Several studies (Caidi et al. 2010; Caidi & MacDonald 2008; Shoham & Kaufman Strauss 2007; Courtright 2005) confirm certain recurring elements in the information behavior of immigrants. Oral sources are most frequently used, and regarded as the most reliable. Information-seeking repeats previous behavior, and new sources are seldom sought. Often the information-seeking is delegated, and new information is refused (Eeli 2014, 68).

We will compare the weak and strong ties among the studied groups, observing how different interpersonal networks are utilized for adaptation. Weak and strong ties form the interpersonal relation networks. While strong ties consist of close contacts, family, kin and

friends, the weak ties include more distant contacts, formal relations, such as employers and colleagues, and acquaintances. In everyday interaction, people tend to rely more on the strong ties, but as these networks tend to share similar values and ways of thought, they are less likely to offer new information and new perspectives, and at times can even be restrictive. Granovetter (1973, 1983) argues, that the weak ties, that act as bridges between different communities, contribute more on an individual's success, finding new and better jobs, adaptation and getting ahead in life. However, he continues, this effect is most positive among the educated high-income groups. For the low-income and uneducated groups, using the weak ties can even result in a negative outcome.

These theories are further discussed in the extensive study of Elfreda Chatman, who used gratification and alienation theories to discuss the information behavior of lower social class people. Chatman (1991) states, that the practices of the poor are deeply focused on gaining instant gratification. As a result, the concept of being able to improve one's own position is largely absent, and the people focus on "getting by", instead of "getting ahead" (Chatman 1991, 439). Any success or improvement in life is often attributed to luck, or work of a higher being, rather than any personal ability or skill. As the opportunities are beyond one's own control, there is little need for long-term planning, and the people are rarely able to imagine a life different from the present or from the past. As concerns and needs concentrate on the immediate, practical reality, the help is sought from local, familiar sources (strong ties), while remaining skeptical of claims outside personal experience (weak ties). The information-poor also tend to use secrecy and deception as protection mechanisms (Chatman 1996, 196).

This project is a qualitative study based on the multi-sited ethnographic method, introduced by George Marcus in 1995 as a means to study the interconnectedness of people on a global scale. It also allows the study of people and ideas through time and space and utilizes the examination of several geographic locations and social networks. The data has been collected during intensive field research periods through structured and semi-structured interviews and participant observation. Information has also been gathered through informal talks, especially during traveling and in various social situations.

For the main study in Jordan, the KoBo Toolbox was utilized. KoBo (<https://www.kobotoolbox.org/>) is a free open source tool for mobile data collection, available to everyone. It allows collection of data in the field using mobile devices such as mobile phones, laptops or tablets. This feature allows researchers to be flexible in dealing with this data, and is continuously being developed and improved to support data collection and updates. The adaptation of KoBo Toolbox for humanitarian use was a joint initiative between the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). The table below (Table 1) presents the basic statistics of the interviews conducted in northern Badia by Dr. Shunnaq and his students.

In Lebanon, the data was collected during three visits to the north in autumn 2019. The places in Akkar include Bqerzala, Halba, Tal Abbas and Hrar, with a special focus on the Wadi Khalid region. Interviews were also conducted in and around Tripoli. Altogether, 44 people were interviewed. Twenty-three belonged to the Bani Khalid tribe, 19 were members of other tribes, while two were non-tribal (NGO workers).

While it was not possible to use a randomized sampling based approach, and the selection of participants is largely based on availability, a sufficient variety of males and females from tribal backgrounds, different age groups and education levels is nevertheless represented in the sample<sup>1</sup>.

In addition to data collected in northern Lebanon, comparative data from previous studies conducted in the Bekaa Valley and Jordan has been used. This data includes interviews and observations of seasonal agricultural workers (mainly Mawali and Hadidiyin from Syria) near Kafraya in August 2017 (grape harvesters), and near Mansoura in November-December 2017 (including overnight stays in the tent of a Hadidi/Khaldi family). During March 2018, Miettunen lived with a Bani Khalid family in Zaatari, Jordan, and interviewed over 40 members of the Jordanian and refugee communities, including NGO workers. Earlier, she conducted field research in southern Jordan, and over a period of almost two decades has regularly visited the tribal communities in the region.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendices A and B for demographic characteristics of participants in Jordan and Lebanon, respectively.

**TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDIED COMMUNITIES IN EACH AREA, BY REGION**

	<b>Local population</b>	<b>Syrian refugee population</b>
Zaatari village, Jordan	Apart from an occasional inter-tribal marriage, exclusively Bani Khalid	Nearly exclusively Bani Khalid
Hamra and Howsha, Jordan	Apart from an occasional inter-tribal marriage, exclusively Bani Khalid	Mostly Bani Khalid, but also other tribes represented
Wadi Khalid, Lebanon	Mixed tribal, Bani Khalid a minority	Mixed, Bani Khalid not documented
Akkar and Tripoli, Lebanon	Mixed, Bani Khalid not documented	Mixed, several Bani Khalid families documented in the region

### **Obstacles and concerns about the research methodology**

#### *Lebanon*

Most of the time while conducting interviews in Lebanon as a non-Arab, the researcher was treated with suspicion. In general, most people were not familiar with the concept of academic research at all. Their first question usually was whether the researcher was from Umam<sup>2</sup>. When she clarified that she was not with Umam, many lost interest in talking. Many did not want to have pictures taken of themselves, their children, or even of their home. While people consented to the use of a recorder, many remained suspicious, reserved and brief during the interview. For that reason, the researcher decided not to use a recorder and resorted to taking notes by writing only, which in the end, proved to be a much more successful strategy.

The researcher is also aware, that most of the times she was introduced to the interviewees by people with a higher status in the society, such as wealthy landowners and entrepreneurs, employing or offering housing to the refugees and local poor. Thus, some people might have felt obliged to give their consent for interviews, since refusing to cooperate could have resulted in losing work opportunities in the future. Nevertheless, interviewees were assured that they

would not be harmed in any way for participating in the research, and that they could refuse to answer any question during the interview with no harm to them. Furthermore, the workers would not reveal information that could cause them problems. The underage boys working in the fields in the Bekaa, for example, refused to reveal their real age out of fear of being beaten or not being allowed to work. The secrecy was also maintained by deception during the communication. A typical way, when asked about the problems, was to refer to God and downplay issues, thus assumedly hoping for the questions to be re-directed to some other topic.

These observations coincide with Chatman's theories of information poverty, and they set a framework of mechanisms utilized by the community in adapting to the situation.

#### *Jordan*

Being members of the society in question enabled the researchers to draw from their own life experiences in addition to the data gathered during fieldwork. For most Bedouin, certain matters are more openly discussed than others. Education, for instance, is an unproblematic subject. Also matters of tradition, religion and village organization can be quite openly discussed. However, questions concerning private connections and relationships are often evaded, and some questions concerning personal experiences may even be considered rude. Furthermore, the topic of family property is a sensitive one; few Bedouin are willing to show land deeds, for example, even though many of them are prepared to discuss general principles of land ownership and tenancy. The researchers have tried to convince informants that the information they provided would be judiciously used so that no personal embarrassment would arise.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations or more specifically UNHCR.

## CONTEXT

### Wadi Khalid

Wadi Khalid, located in the northeastern corner of Lebanon has also been – from the Lebanese point of view – among the most marginalized and least accessible areas. Wadi Khalid belongs to the Governorate of Akkar. Mouchref (2008, 2) classifies Akkar as “one of the most deprived regions in Lebanon, with the highest overall poverty rates in the country”. Her study does not give specific figures for Wadi Khalid to allow comparison to the rest of Akkar. While many issues and obstacles are similar, Wadi Khalid also has many characteristics that seem to differ from the rest of the Governorate, such as the tribal character of the region, as well as the tight contacts and networks across the border (REACH 2014, 19, 27).

The Al-ʿAtiq tribe has approximately 20,000 members who are concentrated on the eastern side of the region, including Hnayder, Kniset Aakkar, Rajem Khalak, Rajem Beit Houssein, Al-Mujdal and Rajem ʿIsa. Al-ʿAtiq is part of al-Nuʿaym-tribe. Al-Ghannam has approximately 16,000 members living in Wadi Khalid, and their areas include the western settlements: Hishe, Rama, Khatt al-Petrol, Jarmanaya, Karm Zibdine, and Bani Sakhr among others. The Bani Khalid tribe also has a presence in Wadi Khalid, but their numbers are much smaller, estimated by the interviewees to be 1,000-2,000. There are three family lines of Bani Khalid, all of which belong to different subtribes. Several families live in the northern parts of Wadi Khalid, but a large number is also living among the other two tribes in the region. In addition, Qarha in the NE is a Shia village, with inhabitants now largely living in Beirut and only seasonally visiting their village.

Until recently, the region had no proper roads or public transportation connecting it to major Lebanese cities. Similarly, many public services have been missing. Interestingly, some residents claimed, that before the war in Syria, they did not even miss or need these services in Wadi Khalid. In fact, some of the interviewed said that the region was better off before the war. Everything they needed was available in Syria, where they went to work in Syrian businesses - especially construction and retail. The workers would stay in Homs during the weekdays and return to Wadi



**IMAGE<sup>3</sup>:** NOVEMBER 2018. SYRIAN REFUGEES LIVING IN THE NORTHERN WADI KHALID. THE SERVICES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THIS AREA ARE ALMOST NON-EXISTENT. THE HOUSES ON THE HILLSIDE ARE IN SYRIA.

Khalid for weekends. The people would also study in Syrian schools, visit the hospitals and doctors, give birth, buy medication, and do their daily grocery shopping. Mostly, they would go to Homs, which was less than 40 km away. In comparison, it is over 60 km to Tripoli. Several former crossing points were shown to the researcher in Wadi Khalid, most of them used by people on foot or on motorcycles. The journey to Homs was considered safe, also by the women, who frequented the city to do shopping and use the services.

Naturally, this region was also an important hub for smuggling, and various commodities were traveling across the border to both directions, providing many residents with cheap goods and steady income.<sup>4</sup> Still, in the 1980’s, the road from Homs to Tartus crossed briefly through the northern end of Wadi Khalid. This short stretch of path, “Bukaya road”, became a central point for legal and illegal trade. The market of Aarida was famous as a place for buying various

<sup>3</sup> All images by P. Miettunen.

<sup>4</sup> Frequent border crossing and smuggling is not only typical for Wadi Khalid. Similar practices were common for many communities living near the Syrian border (see e.g., Obeid 2010 for the study of the Aarsal region). However, a flatter terrain when going east, a short distance to Homs and in proximity of a major road are advantages for Wadi Khalid.

commodities. A railway connection from Beirut via Tripoli to Homs also ran through the region about 25 years ago and the railroad tracks can still be seen in places.

The area around the road and the railroad belonged to the lands of the Ghannam tribe, who was able to benefit from this opportunity. Even today, this tribe owns most of the agricultural land and businesses in Wadi Khalid. The town of Hishe – which belongs to the Ghannam – has the best services in Wadi Khalid, among them the only schools beyond the elementary level. This is where the students from the whole region go after the first years of schooling. The first political representative from Wadi Khalid was elected to the Lebanese parliament in 2002. He and his successor are from the same lineage of the Ghannam.

## **Jordan**

Bani Khalid is one of the larger tribes in Jordan, having already been present in the region before the establishment of the Emirate. The tribe is centered in and around four villages: Zaatari, Howsha, Hamra and Khaldiya, and they are neighbors to several other tribes of northern Badia, including Ahl al-Jabal, Isa, Bani Sakhr and Sirhan. The subtribes of Bani Khalid in Jordan include:

1. Al Hadiyan
2. Al-Soubiehat
3. Al-Jubur
4. Al-Nuhud
5. Al-Nebietat
6. Al-Turshan
7. Al-Rutub and Al-Bawadi

The members of the tribe have maintained ties to their kin on the Syrian side. Especially the Nuhud, who mainly live in Zaatari, were known for having close contacts to the Nuhud living in Syria. People spoke about attending weddings and funerals, tribal gatherings (*majalis*), and intermarriage across the border. Due to this frequent traffic between Jordan and Syria, the Bani Khalid have also been involved in legal and illegal business across the border. Still, the area is mostly agricultural and many families own flocks of sheep. Before the arrival of Syrian refugees, there was very little private business in the villages. The public sector employs many members of the tribe, for example in the army, police, healthcare and education. Especially the Bawadi

and Rutub are considered prestigious clans because of their economic status and their strong presence in the security and military apparatuses. Zaatari is connected to Mafraq by regular public transportation, and many young men and women from the village study in the nearby Al Bayt University.

## RESULTS: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES SINCE 2011

Due to their tribal contacts and relations, many Syrian Bani Khalid preferred Jordan as a place of refuge. Even if there were no personal or individual links or relations, they would nevertheless be welcomed and accepted into the Jordanian community because they carried the same tribal name, and their ancestors had relations and affinities. As the two groups share the same manners, traditions, norms, and customs, there was little need to go through social adaptation when joining tribal members across the borders. The main difference is dialectal.

Some of the interviewees in Lebanon mentioned that the young men were often sent out first, to avoid them being conscripted to the army. As the conflict continued, the other family members also started fleeing. Other families, however, have chosen to leave simultaneously. When Jordan closed its northern border, people started migrating towards Turkey.

Lebanon and Jordan have a very different refugee policy: Jordan has established refugee camps where Syrians refugees are expected to officially register, and they can only leave the camp through the *kafala* system. Lebanon, on the other hand, does not have such a policy, and thus most refugees do not have an official status. In 2015, 70 per cent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon did not have valid permits of stay, and 92 per cent were working without an employment contract (Mansour 2017, 4). Since then, working and living legally in the country has been made more complicated, while many support and food coupon programs have been discontinued. Therefore, it is very unlikely that these figures have improved in any way.

According to Jordan's Department of Statistics and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) figures from September 6, 2018, the total population size of Jordan is over 10.2 million. There are 1.4 million Syrians in Jordan, with only 670,429 of them formally registered as refugees with the UNHCR. Of this group, less than 20% are living in the established refugee camps: Zaatari, Azraq, Marjib al-Fahud and CyberCity.

In 2011, the influx of refugees began to the Zaatari camp. However, large numbers of the Bani Khalid coming from Homs left the camp to live in the nearby village of Zaatari. A quick survey done during a previous research project in March 2018 among the group of 15 men and women attending an information class about the dangers of smoking reveals that none of them stayed in the refugee camp more than two weeks. Some had left the camp on the first day after registering themselves as refugees, but then joined their relatives in the Zaatari village via *kafala*. It should be noted, though, that *kafala* makes the Jordanian sponsor legally responsible for the refugee's actions in case of a crime. They are not responsible for supporting the refugee financially or providing any other means of livelihood.

The villagers offered private land for the refugees to build their tents and caravans. Some of these structures have since then been turned into small houses. The number of Syrian Bani Khalid in the village has increased, nearly equaling the number of Jordanian residents. This has increased pressure on the healthcare, education and infrastructure services.

The international aid directed at the Syrian refugees and the presence of international organizations and NGOs inside the Zaatari refugee camp created much resentment among the Jordanian population. In Zaatari town, the local community saw themselves as carrying much of the burden of helping and supporting the refugees, yet received little or no aid for their task. The local Mayor councils requested the international and regional agencies to give aid to those villages and towns that have received many refugees. These agencies responded positively to these requests. The role of the local councils was to let local communities participate in decision-making and the definition of priorities according to their specific needs.

Based on these priorities, the municipality started infrastructure improvement projects with the support of the World Bank. Since 2011, the municipality has opened networks of streets exceeding 300 thousand square meters to cope with urban expansion, and purchased modern equipment needed for public maintenance, such as waste compartments, SUVs, ladders, water tanks, sludge pumps, drilling compaction and pesticide spraying tractors. In addition, the municipality has set up a large municipal playground and another small service for young people, in addition to establishing two learning centers offering vocational training for young women

in sewing, cosmetics, computer and other topics. A workshop for sewing clothes, a vegetable and fruit market, a multipurpose hall and commercial store buildings have also been constructed. All these new installations were built to address the needs of poor families from both nationalities, whether they be Jordanians or Syrian refugees.

Other enterprises initiated by the municipality include the “free medical days” campaign, where more than 2,000 Syrian and Jordanian patients have been treated so far. Other initiatives also conduct public hygiene campaigns involving Syrians and Jordanians, attract international and local organizations to distribute aid to the poor families, support tent residents especially in the wintertime, and organize seminars and awareness lectures to mitigate intolerance between Jordanians and Syrians living in one area. Decision-making has involved both Syrians and Jordanians, and committees of Syrian and Jordanian dignitaries have been formed to discuss matters and offer solutions to specific issues in the area.

Naturally, more land had to be purchased for the facilities and infrastructure mentioned. When land was purchased from private landowners, the price of land quickly increased, especially along the main streets. This has been triggered by the Syrian capital or Syrian labor that contributed to the establishment of services and the investment in these main streets (*suqs*) in the villages and towns. These projects were mainly under Jordanian names but financed by Syrian money and built with Syrian labor.

The economic impact of the refugee surge is most acutely felt by the poorest members of the tribe. Low-income tribal members have little patience or sympathy for their new neighbors, even if they are relatives. While they admit that it is their responsibility to help their kin, many also note that this hospitality could and should not be extended endlessly. While the target of this resentment are the refugees, there is also a clear rift forming within the tribe in Jordan. While a tribal society was never truly egalitarian, this ideal still lives in the minds of the people. *Sheikhs* were expected to distribute their wealth to other members of the tribe and show hospitality and generosity even to the poorest. Today, an increasing number of wealthy villas and large estates have been built on the outskirts of the old Zaatari village. Some are owned by people who have acquired their wealth working in the Gulf States or Saudi Arabia. Others have been able to

benefit from the refugee situation, finding jobs in and getting foreign funding for projects helping the refugees. Locals also mention drug trafficking and smuggling of weapons and other goods between Syria and Jordan, although it is close to impossible to find anyone admitting to it. At the same time, a large part of the tribe remains in poverty and has been left to compete for donations and charity funds with the ever-growing refugee population. The local poor feel that they have been forgotten and all aid goes to the refugees. This sentiment increases resentment and envy towards the Syrians.

As a result of the conflict in Syria, over 1.5 million refugees are estimated to be living in Lebanon. (Mansour 2017). As mentioned earlier, 70% do not have a valid permit of stay, and 92% are working without a contract. There are no separate statistics of refugees with a Bedouin background. However, due to their history, the tribal groups have more established connections and prior work experience in Lebanon. Before the war, it was common for many tribal men to come to Lebanon for a few months at the time. Some of them worked in the fields in the Bekaa Valley, harvesting grapes and other crops, while others worked in towns in construction sites. During low seasons, they returned home to their families and farms. When the war in Syria broke out, these workers brought their families along, settling in Lebanon. Most of these families have received aid from UN humanitarian missions, but their networks have also helped them to maintain a level of integrity during the years of refuge.

Wadi Khalid was quickly affected by the conflict, with missiles and snipers occasionally hitting the region. Openly crossing the border to Syria became practically impossible. At the same time, an increasing flow of refugees started entering Wadi Khalid. Eventually, the region of approx. 40,000 inhabitants ended up supporting almost the same number of Syrian refugees. As the residents had also lost their own jobs, income and services in Syria, the situation became very difficult. The poor region started turning more towards Lebanon, asking for support and aid.

Many things have changed: paved roads now connect Wadi Khalid to Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley, and minibuses have regular connections to Tripoli and smaller towns in Akkar. Along the main road, it is possible to see many small businesses: grocery stores, repair shops, bakeries, saloons, etc., a majority of them staffed by Syrian refugees. However,

the area remains poor and underdeveloped. There is no industry in the region, with agriculture being the most important source of income, followed by the public sector. The few influential families are involved in politics and international businesses, and have relatives working abroad. Schools, mosques, healthcare centers and sports fields have been built, many of them with money donated from the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Canada, among others. This fragmentary field of outside aid, especially in Wadi Khalid, is problematic. What the community needs, and what the sponsor wants to offer do not always coincide. Corruption was also mentioned as a major hindrance for development.

### Entrepreneurship

In Wadi Khalid and in Zaatari the number of small businesses has increased significantly since the influx of refugees. The businesses of the Syrian refugees filled a niche that had been mostly empty before. The local residents often stated that the Bedouin of Jordan and Lebanon were not business-oriented, and it was the Syrians who thought of establishing these businesses in these regions.

In Jordan, Zaatari town provides a good example of the economic impact of the refugees. Today, most businesses are located on the main street, or alongside the Baghdad Highway that runs past the town. This main street had very few services before the crisis and only started flourishing after it. The buildings have shops on the ground floor and apartments or offices on all other floors. Syrian families own some of these businesses but usually they are registered under the name of a close kinship member of the Jordanian Bani Khalid. These partnerships were documented unofficially in the presence of the *sheikhs* of the clans. The apartments are rented to Syrians and Jordanians and owned mainly by the Jordanian Bani Khalid. While the people in the three Jordanian towns and in Wadi Khalid alike generally acknowledge the positive impact that Syrian entrepreneurship has provided to the local economy, the increase of property prices is also mentioned. Especially in Zaatari people were concerned about the rise of land and property costs along the main street.

During a survey conducted along the main street of Zaatari in 2018, a number of small businesses were documented (see the table). The most common type was a small grocery store, usually with limited

selection of goods and located in one room, although also larger “supermarkets” were present. There was a fairly even distribution of other types, with a variety of businesses and services present.

**TABLE 2. SURVEY OF BUSINESSES ALONG THE MAIN STREET OF ZAATARI VILLAGE**

Survey of businesses along the main street of Zaatari village	
Grocery stores	60
Restaurants	12
Brick/Quarry/Construction	10
Sale of building materials and / or sanitary ware	9
Blacksmith	8
Hairdressers	7
Bakeries	6
Sale of car tires and / or car parts	6
Sale of mobile phones and accessories	6
Sterilization, filtration and filling of water tanks	5
Meat, fish and poultry	4
Cleaning and ironing	4
Carpentry	4
Freezers & Dairy	3
Sale of clothes and/or shoes	3
Soft drinks	2
Repair of electrical appliances	2
Pharmacies	2
Book shops	2
Sale of home furniture and accessories	2
Gas station	1
Lounge/chair rental	1

In Lebanon, similar patterns were observed in Wadi Khalid. Especially the town of Hishe witnessed a great increase in small businesses after the arrival of the refugees. The partnership system also resembles the one used in northern Jordan, with the business registered formally in the name of a Lebanese citizen, while the trade or services are de facto run by Syrians. While there was never any mention of exploitation and maltreatment, the fact that in Wadi Khalid the Lebanese and Syrians are not as closely related as in Zaatari, for example, raised a concern of the possibility. On the other hand, the inhabitants and refugees in Wadi Khalid frequently brought up the trust and safety they feel in the area, due to the shared tribal values and traditions.



**IMAGE: NOVEMBER 2017. THURSDAY MARKET IN GHAZZA, BEKAA.**

In comparison, the Syrian Bani Khalid interviewed in the non-tribal areas of Akkar and Tripoli were not involved in entrepreneurship, or their businesses were very small and informal, such as vegetable carts or small pop-up stalls. Naturally, in these areas there is already much more competition as local businesses already exist in abundance. The weaker personal ties between possible partners may also give more room for exploitation.

In a previous study conducted in the Western Bekaa in March 2018, some of the local (non-tribal) people seemed threatened by the presence of the refugee entrepreneurs. According to a Christian family, the Syrians had totally taken over the traditional Thursday market held in Ghazza, and the Lebanese could no longer go there for shopping. Visiting the market confirmed the strong ties to Syria and the presence of Syrian customers. The items sold were brought from Syria. Clothing, shoes, toys and domestic utensils were said to be much cheaper than the Lebanese ones.

### **Seasonal work**

The fact that many of the men had been employed as seasonal workers in Lebanon before the war was the main reason for choosing the location for their camp. Earlier connections were used in finding work for the family, for renting land and providing electricity and water.

Local farmers often choose to contact the workers they knew previously when hiring labor during the

harvest. However, what seemed to be more common, especially in the case of major agricultural and wine producers, was to have a limited number of contacts among these worker groups. These selected people would then act as *shaweesh*.

The tribal *shaweesh* are often heads of family groups, or older relatives of the heads of clans or subtribes. They had been working seasonally in the region long before the war and had established connections to landowners. When seasonal workers are needed in the fields, especially during the time of harvest, the landowners would contact these key persons among the worker groups. The *shaweesh* select a group of workers who are then taken to the fields. The selection is usually made among the kin group, so the workers are generally related to the *shaweesh*. The leaders get a commission for this task. A wooden or plastic stick carried – and sometimes also used – by the leader shows their status as overseers of the worker group. Women, young girls and boys, and occasionally elderly men are the most common workers, while the work leaders in the observed situations were all middle-aged men. Many of the younger workers refused to divulge their age, as many were under the legal age to be working in the fields. This is the kind of information that both workers and especially the work leaders want to keep hidden in order to avoid problems.

There was little indication that the people were trying to find information about other jobs. When asked about their plans, most simply expressed their desire to return to Syria after the war, to rebuild their home and their farm as it was before and continue their previous life. There were some people in my set of informants – mostly younger generation – who seemed to prefer staying in Lebanon, or even move abroad. Yet, as they asked about opportunities abroad, their main questions were: do people speak Arabic there, and are there many fields where they could work as manual laborers. Some also mentioned moving to Beirut, but this option was generally regarded as less optimal: the city is expensive, and it is difficult to find work.

### **Case Study 1**

Hishe, Wadi Khalid. A young Mawali man of about 30 years old is keeping a fruit juice stall. A Lebanese from the town legally owned the stall, but the Syrian man is mainly responsible for the sales. He is originally from Homs, where he studied law at the university,

but had gained work experience from restaurant and hotel businesses where he worked to earn money for his studies. His family were farmers with agricultural fields and poultry farming. One of his siblings is living in England, while others are staying with him in a small house that they rent from the owner. He is married to a Syrian woman but they have no children. The family chose to come to Wadi Khalid because it was a tribal area. They first lived in Kniset Akkar, but then moved to Hishe. During the six years in Lebanon, the interviewee has been working as a volunteer in an NGO, and then doing “all kinds of jobs”. If there is peace once more in Syria, he wishes to return home.

### Case Study 2

Hishe, Wadi Khalid. The Mawali family from Homs is living in a small rented house. All the children go to school. The father of the family is currently not working but has been doing some agricultural work when available. The mother generates income for the family by sewing clothing for children. She is employed by a Lebanese buyer who provides clothing to NGOs. The buyer regularly brings a bundle of cloth, from which the mother sews the clothes and returns the products to the buyer. Having had only six years of basic education, she hopes that all her children will have an opportunity to continue their studies.

### Case Study 3

Baddawi, Tripoli. An old couple is living in a small, windowless storage room that has been transformed into a living space. They are part of a group of 15 related Bani Khalid families who moved to the region together in 2012. These families have all rented spaces in the same neighborhood. The couple mentions that they are not related to the Bani Khalid in Wadi Khalid, and do not know them. In Syria, they owned a house in Homs. Part of the clan were still living in tents and kept flocks of goats and sheep. They have not had any formal education, but all their children have gone to school. They also consider education very important in modern times. They have close relatives living in Canada, France, Turkey and Jordan, as well as those who stayed in Syria. Some of them have escaped to Idlib, while others continue cultivating land. They call each other regularly. During the first years as refugees, the couple received food coupons and some money from the UN on a monthly basis but have not received any in two years. Their children and younger relatives support them. Many of them had been coming to Lebanon already before the

war, working in construction, restaurants, and selling vegetables from carts. According to them, all people carrying heavy things in constructions were Syrians. The couple says that the Syrians are not stealing jobs from the Lebanese, because the Syrians do “all the jobs that the Lebanese don’t want to do.”

### Case Study 4

Southeast of Tripoli. A large Bani Khalid family is living in a self-made tent next to a leather tanning factory. The family consists of the old couple, their three adult sons and unmarried daughters, the wives of their sons, and their small children; altogether, there were 14 people present. The interview was mostly with the eldest son. The family originally comes from the outskirts of Homs, where they had a house with fields and flocks of sheep and goats. The sons had gone to school for seven years, after which they started working. As they lived farther away from the city, there was no higher education available near their home. They had contacts in Jordan before the war, to the same lineage (*fakhd*). Nevertheless, they chose to come to Lebanon, because they had been working there seasonally in the leather factory before the war. They were able to get work at the same factory so they could continue to support their family.

## THE CASE OF TRIBAL WOMEN

In the traditional tribal communities, the division of labor between the genders was very clear, but the contributions of both men and women were seen as necessary and crucial for the survival of the community. Women produce the tent, manufacture textiles, produce dairy products, and are also in charge of transmitting the traditional oral heritage and cultural norms to the children (Abumelhim 2013, 30). Normally, a woman's dowry (usually jewelry) was hers to wear or use. Selling pastoral products made by women, such as cheese and yoghurt provided part of the family income. Honor, modesty and pride were equally expected from Bedouin men and women alike. Thus, while women in the tribal community were not regarded as equal, their skills were needed and respected, and gave women a sense of meaning and pride.

Moving to a sedentary, urban or rural way of life made many of the desert skills redundant. On the other hand, sedentarization of the tribal communities has resulted in increased stability, social and political integration, better access to healthcare, public services, education and job opportunities. However, in many cases in Syria and Lebanon, the tribes became part of the rural poor, working on small lots of land, or becoming seasonal workers moving across the border to look for work, especially in agriculture and construction.

As the honor-based patriarchal system of the tribal communities prevented women from working outside their homes, many women during this transit period were left uneducated, married at a young age and stayed at home as unskilled workforce. The tribal communities still maintain ancient norms of honor and decency, which restrict women's participation in public life. The surrounding society maintains and controls these values and can make it difficult for women to leave the house in fear of arrest or defamation of their reputation. This way of thinking, however, is slowly changing. Education has played a major role in changing the roles and status of Bedouin women, and is directly linked to women's participation in work outside the home. It has also contributed to their economic independence, and social and political awareness.

During an earlier research project in 2011, a south Jordanian Huwayti woman in her late 40s explained how she had been the first girl to attend the local school. She quit after three or four years, as her honor was being questioned due to her studying with boys. Her three daughters all have college degrees, and all of them asserted that the girls today are more eager to continue studying than the boys are. The same pattern was observed in northern Jordan and Lebanon: the generation of women now reaching middle age had no longer learned the traditional skills, but did not receive much formal education, either. Their daughters, however, are studying in universities, and have expressed more interest in studying than the boys of their age group. In northern Badia, a girl's high level of education is increasingly seen as a prerequisite when a young man is looking for a wife. In Wadi Khalid, the young girls usually went to Tripoli for higher level studies. The Al Bayt University near Mafraq was one of the universities frequented by the youth of Badia. Observing the student life in the university campus revealed that the tribal values were strictly maintained: interaction between the sexes was restricted and internally controlled. In addition to keeping to their own gender groups, the students also formed social circles based on tribal groups.

As their level of education increases, the women also have more options for work. The tribal communities in Jordan still suffer from low monthly incomes: according to information received from the Mafraq municipality office, in the northern Badia, 27% of households earn less than 100 dinars, and 16% between 100-150 dinars. Women's contribution to the monthly income may therefore be a significant asset to the family. Still, many women only work a few years before getting married, then assume the role of housewife and mother. As the number of children in the families has decreased, women also get an opportunity to return to work once the children are older.

Typical careers for women are in education, healthcare and NGOs (Abumelhim, 2013, 30). Especially education is seen as an extension of housework, and thus a natural option for women. Female teachers have a respected social status in the Bedouin society, which also makes them preferred candidates for marriage to the young men. On a more practical level, work in schools ends in the early afternoons, which leaves the woman time to take care of all domestic responsibilities before her husband returns home from work. According to the Mayor of Zaatari village,



**IMAGE: NOVEMBER 2017. THE FOOD STORAGE OF A SYRIAN HADIDI FAMILY NEAR MANSOURA, BEKAA. THE WOMEN MAKE CHEESE AND YOGHURT FROM THE MILK OF THE FAMILY'S FLOCK OF SHEEP AND GOATS. PICKLED VEGETABLES ARE ALSO MADE AT HOME.**

the percentage of women employed outside home in the north Badia is about 27%. Thus, over 70% of women in the Badia are staying at home. The process of increasing the employment rate of women of the Badia is supported by various social services and projects. Development institutions provide small and medium loans, as well as opportunities for training and rehabilitation, in addition to various income-generating economic projects for Bedouin women.

When asked about the main differences between Lebanese/Jordanian and Syrian tribal communities, the Lebanese and Jordanian interviewees usually commented on the differing attitudes towards educating women. They saw Syrians as people who do not educate their girls, but instead marry them off young. For Lebanese and Jordanians, the higher level of education of the girls and women in their own community was expressed positively and with pride. In contrast, the Syrian refugees rarely brought up the question of education on their own. When asked directly, many were somewhat defensive, referring to it as “our way”, or the “Arab way”: “the girls marry young and have many children”.

Among the tribal communities from Syria living in the Bekaa, the education situation was very difficult. While most of the children had attended school in Syria, they – especially the girls – rarely continued their studies past the sixth grade. Some were able to attend school that had been arranged by the Lebanese government for the refugees for free.

However, many expressed several issues concerning the school. First, the teaching was in French or English, languages that Syrians rarely knew beyond the very basics. Second, the school was far from many of the families, and they were concerned about the safety of their children, again especially their daughters. Walking back from school in the dark alone was frightening to many of the children, and they did not want to return to school. Finally, the school did not issue a certificate after the completed studies. One Hadidi girl had gone to school in the Bekaa for three years but had received no certificates to prove it. Returning to Syria, this would very likely cause her problems if she wanted to continue her studies.

The situation seemed to be slightly better in Wadi Khalid. As has been a common practice in Lebanon and Jordan, the schools are running in two shifts: the Syrian children attend the classes in the evenings. The safety of the children had been addressed by organizing minivans to drive the students to and from school. However, no Syrian youth attending classes beyond the basic education level could be found for interview.

With a large percentage of men fighting in the war, missing, dead or disabled, many Syrian women have had to assume the main responsibility of providing a livelihood for their family. Since their level of education is generally low, their possibilities for finding work are very limited. Women end up working in the fields, and for unskilled work in the fields, the women and girls tend to be paid less than men and boys.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on this study, the people of tribal background have had a number of strategies when leaving Syria. The Bani Khalid who fled to Jordan chose to utilize the strong ties of their social networks. Most had utilized the *kafala* system to leave the refugee camp as soon as possible. The large number of Bani Khalid already living in Jordan, and the contacts they maintained across the border before the war allowed many to find a place with their own tribe – and in the best case, with their own close kin. Those moving to Bani Khalid villages could find jobs employed by their Jordanian relatives or formed a partnership to establish small businesses. These workers are mainly men, while women still mostly stay at home doing household work, raising children and tending livestock. They were also able to make use of aid provided by NGOs. In addition, there are various donations for the refugees, such as school bags for children, donated by Saudi Arabia, or trailer homes from a private donor. In certain areas, the Jordanian Bani Khalid have benefited from the situation: local inhabitants were employed in aid projects, and the economy of Bani Khalid towns and villages has grown with the new businesses. On the other hand, land prices are on the rise.

The fact that especially Zaatari (including the refugees) consists almost exclusively of members of the same tribe seems to have made town planning and distribution of aid somewhat easier. In cases of business and shop ownership, the kinship ties probably prevent worst cases of mistreatment. Usually, within family groups and households, the income is distributed so that those unable to work for a living (elderly, young, sick, etc.) will receive their share. A few workers may thus be financially supporting a large number of people within the same family group.

The Syrian Bani Khalid who decided to go to Lebanon utilized the weak ties of their networks. In contrast to their fellow tribe members in Jordan who relied on their familial or strong ties, for them, prior work-related connections in the country were the most important factor in determining their destination, and the men took their families to the places where they had been working seasonally before the war.

The family groups and households continue living together and supporting each other. For those previously working in factories and construction, the working pattern appears to have continued, only with a more permanent presence. However, it seems that with agricultural work, the women, children and elderly became more involved in salaried work. While seasonal agricultural work was also available in Jordan, Bani Khalid members going to Jordan considered it less important.

Similar patterns of engaging in salaried work were also observed in the Bekaa Valley, mainly among Hadidi and Mawali tribes. International aid, food coupons and donations were also available for refugees in Lebanon, but there seems to have been some discontinuation in recent years. Talking with Hadidi refugees in the Bekaa in the end of 2018 revealed that maintaining refugee status had made their situation more complicated, requiring more frequent visits to registration offices and paying more money, and an increasing number of refugees could not follow up.

Finally, Wadi Khalid gives another example of an adaptation strategy, resembling that of northern Jordan. While there were no Syrian Bani Khalid among the interviewed people, all were of tribal background. They had no *weak ties* to the region, as they only came to Wadi Khalid as refugees, and not because they previously worked in the area. On the other hand, the definition of strong ties does not fully apply either, as they had no relatives or close friends in the area. However, in Wadi Khalid, the refugees and Lebanese alike expressed their preference on living in tribal areas. Staying in communities with shared values and traditions increased their feeling of security, especially for the girls.

In general, the people saw living among tribal communities – whether it was the same or a different tribe – as a positive feature. Wadi Khalid was considered “safe”, as the people could trust others who were also ‘Arab’. The fact that there was no need to lock houses or cars even after the coming of the refugees was given as an example of the mutual trust and honesty. The safety of the girls due to people sharing the same values of modesty and honor was also mentioned on several occasions. In contrast, people living in other areas of Akkar, in Tripoli and in the Western Bekaa were much more concerned with the safety of their daughters and did not trust the local communities. Thus, based on the importance of tribal solidarity and the shared values and

traditions, we believe strong ties defines the networks in Wadi Khalid more closely. Lebanese and Syrian partners establishing small businesses in cooperation with one another, being employed in agricultural work, owning livestock, as well as work provided by NGOs, charity and international aid, were all present in the refugee livelihood strategies in Wadi Khalid.

The use of strong and weak ties in adaptation reflects the observations of Granovetter (1973). For marginalized groups such as Syrian refugees of tribal background, strong ties provide certain positive effects through intra-group solidarity and economic support and opportunities that are based on shared identity and mutual trust. On the other hand, the strong ties maintain the in-group cohesion and traditional values, offering fewer contacts outside the group. Based on the tribal traditions, the opportunities provided by strong ties are mainly for men, while women are expected to focus on their traditional household tasks. Women's participation in the work force becomes more accepted if there are no adult males in the household, or if they are unable to work. On the other hand, the younger generations of tribal women in Wadi Khalid and Jordan are much more educated, marry later, work more often outside the home and participate more in politics and society, than the previous generations. For that reason, they may provide alternative narratives for the Syrian tribal women living among them.

The weak ties utilized by tribal refugees in Lebanon are not so much about gaining new skills and opportunities, but just as much about maintaining and securing livelihoods based on earlier experience and low-wage labor. Although their contacts exist outside the tribal group, they can offer very little outside the already established contacts.

As the adaptation mechanisms in strong and weak tie strategies are different, so should the policies and solutions targeting the communities address the differences. In both cases, mapping the actual needs of the community, listening to the people on who they see as trustworthy representatives among themselves, and building coordination between the NGOs and sponsors, could provide better results in targeting aid, and building sustainable development. When planning actions for groups who rely on strong tie strategies, the whole community should be included. This strengthens the interaction between the Syrians and their Jordanian/Lebanese hosts providing equal opportunities and preventing resentment in the host community.

This report recommends paying more attention to a more equal distribution of employment when creating NGO-related jobs and projects for local hosts. The Matthew-effect tends to be an issue among the tribal communities, where members offer jobs first to their own kin and closest relatives. Thus, the ones who have better language skills and who are used to working with foreigners continue to receive more opportunities, leaving other parts of the community outside the benefits of the project.

The current system where the formal owner of a business must be a Lebanese or Jordanian, another adaptation strategy sometimes used by Syrian Bani Khaled, opens the door to many issues. While the system may work well, in the worst case the Syrian worker can be subject to mistreatment. In most cases, the Syrian workers have been bringing new forms of business into tribal regions where such entrepreneurship was largely unknown. This type of agency should be supported and encouraged.

The growing positive view towards women's education among the tribal communities in Jordan and Lebanon has a potential to change the attitudes of the Syrian tribal refugees living in these communities. Unfortunately, the everyday realities of these people do not provide much opportunity to make concrete changes: the difficulties related to girls' school attendance has been discussed above. In addition, many girls are expected to join the work force to earn money for the family. The issue of child marriage is also well known.

In the communities that have chosen adaptation through weak ties, we believe providing and securing education and training for women and children would benefit the group the most. Considering the fact that the young boys and girls in the communities in rural areas are often expected to work, they are most likely to drop out of school. The *shaweesh* can play a key role here, as they are responsible for picking the workers, and often have to choose from the young and the old within a group of relatives. When planning work opportunities or projects for women, or schooling for girls, safety, means of transportation and childcare are often the bottlenecks for female participation. Thus, providing transportation to and from school or work, and providing possibilities for nursery/kindergarten if the work or school is far away from the home, can make the situation significantly easier for the women. Lastly, providing opportunities for secondary education and vocational training is essential to prevent a lost generation of Syrian youth.

## REFERENCES

- Abumelhim, Mohammad Husni. 2013. "Women and Social Change in Jordanian Bedouin Society." *Studies in Sociology of Science* 4, no. 4: 27-31.
- Al-Sekhaneh, Wassef. 2005. *The Bedouin of Northern Jordan. Kinship, Cosmology and Ritual Exchange*. Doctoral dissertation.
- Antoun, Richard. 2000. "Civil Society, Tribal Process, and Change in Jordan: An Anthropological View." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, no. 4: 441-463. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/259420>.
- Caidi, Nadia, Danielle Allard and Lisa Quirke. 2010. "Information practices of immigrants." *Annual Review of Information Science and Technology* 44, no. 1: 491-531.
- Caidi, Nadia and Susan MacDonald. 2008. "Information practices of Canadian Muslims post 9/11." *Government Information Quarterly* 25: 348-378.
- Chatman, Elfreda. 1996. "The Impoverished Life-World of Outsiders." *Journal of the American Society for Information Science* 47, no. 3: 193-206.
- Chatman, Elfreda. 1991. "Life in a Small World: Applicability of Gratification Theory to Information-Seeking Behavior." *Journal of the American Society for Information Science* 42, no. 6: 438-449.
- Chatty, Dawn. 2011. "Bedouin in Lebanon: The Transformation of a Way of Life or an Attitude?" *International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care* 6, no. 3: 21-30. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5042/ijmhsc.2011.0061>
- Chatty, Dawn. 2010. "The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control." *Middle East Journal* 64, no. 1: 29-49. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20622981>
- Courtright, C. 2005. "Health information-seeking among Latino newcomers: An exploratory study." *Information Research* 10, no. 2, paper 224.
- Dukhan, Haiyan. 2014. "Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising." *Syria Studies Journal* 6, no. 2: 1-28.
- Eeli, Katja. 2014. *Maahanmuuttajanaisten tiedontarpeet ja tiedonhankinta*. ("Immigrant women's information needs and information seeking") Unpublished MA –thesis, University of Tampere.
- Eickelman, Dale. 2002. *The Middle East and Central Asia. An Anthropological Approach*. Prentice Hall.
- Ghawanmeh, Y. 1982. *al-Ta'rikh al-ḥadārī li-sharq al-Urdunn fi l-'aṣr al-Mamlūki*, Amman.
- Granovetter, Mark. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no 6: 1360-1380.
- Granovetter, Mark. 1983. "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited." *Sociological Theory* 1: 201-233.
- Heras, Nicholas and Carole O'Leary. 2013. "The Tribal Factor in Syria's Rebellion: A Survey of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria." *Terrorism Monitor* 11, no. 13.
- <https://jamestown.org/program/the-tribal-factor-in-syrias-rebellion-a-survey-of-armed-tribal-groups-in-syria/>
- Joseph, Suzanne. 2013. *Fertile Bonds. Bedouin Class, Kinship and Gender in the Bekaa Valley*. University Press of Florida.
- Khaddour, Kheder and Kevin Mazur. 2017. *Eastern Expectations. The Changing Dynamics in Syria's Tribal Regions*. Carnegie Middle East Center, Carnegie-MEC.org.
- Madden, A.D., J. Palimi and J. Bryson. 2006. "Information Behaviour in Pre-literate Societies." in *New Directions in Human Information Behaviour. Information Science and Knowledge Management* 8. Springer, USA.
- Mansour, Kholoud. 2017. *UN Humanitarian Coordination in Lebanon. The Consequences of Excluding Syrian Actors*. Chatham House.
- Mouchref, Aicha. 2008. *Forgotten Akkar. Socio-Economic Reality of the Akkar Region*. Mada Association. [www.mada.org.lb/akkar](http://www.mada.org.lb/akkar)
- Naffee, Ibrahim. 2012. *Free Syrian Army gets tribal support*, Arabnews.com June 21. <http://www.arabnews.com/free-syrian-army-gets-tribal-support>

Obeid, Michelle. 2010. "Searching for the 'ideal face of the state' in a Lebanese border town." *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 16, no. 2: 330-346.

REACH. 2014. *Lebanese Communities Hosting Syrian Refugees. Akkar Governorate – Lebanon*. Assessment report July.

REACH. 2014. *Syrian Refugees Staying in Informal Tented Settlements in Jordan*. Multi-Sector Assessment Report August.

Rowland, Jennifer. 2009. "Democracy and the Tribal System in Jordan: Tribalism as a Vehicle for Social Change." *Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection*, Paper 749. [http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp\\_collection/749](http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/749)

Shoham, S. and S. Kaufmann Strauss. 2007. "Information needs of North American immigrants to Israel." *Journal of Information, Communication & Ethics in Society* 5, no. 2–3: 185–205.

Tajfel, Henri. 1981. *Social identity and intergroup relations*. Cambridge University Press.

## APPENDIX A: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF TRIBAL COMMUNITIES

The Bedouin are most often defined by their economy on one hand, and their social structure on the other. The traditional idea of a Bedouin described them as desert-dwelling nomads with the main means of livelihood based on herds of camels, sheep or goats, moving from place to place in search of pastures in an annual cycle. Socially, the Bedouin are a “segmentary society”: the tribe, or confederation of tribes, forms the largest social unit, but within the tribe, sub-groups, or tribal segments exist (Eickelman 2002,120; Al-Sekhaneh 2005,85). The tribal ties determine the life of an individual and the tribe is considered the source of protection, justice, wealth and status. In return, the preservation of the family honor remains the duty of every individual within the tribal community.

Madden, Palimi & Bryson (2006) have studied non-literate tribal societies, where oral tradition plays an essential role in information-sharing. They conclude, that information-sharing plays three main functions in an oral community: 1) Defining tribal identity through history and mythology, 2) Preserving social networks, 3) Promulgation of practical skills, including hunting, house-building and agronomy. These functions are also present in the traditional Bedouin society. All the knowledge has been transmitted orally from generation to generation: the customs, traditions, history and knowledge of the desert is embedded in a reservoir of poems, songs, stories and sayings. The stories of the past often focus on wars and leaders. Although they provide a very male-centered view on the past, they also provide a communal memory of the tribe, a joined experience where all members can participate. They have also strengthened the feeling of pride and self-appreciation and have enabled the individuals to construct a positive view of the self, and of the tribal identity as a whole.

Preservation of social networks is also partially reinforced by the tribal histories. The stories pay much attention to genealogies and ancestral origins – either actual, or mythological – and as such, generate the feeling of continuity and communality. Equally important is the tribal law, which enforces negotiation

and mediation – but also extends the punishment and revenge to family members in situations of blood feuds (Antoun 2000, 446). Even everyday interactions contribute to the preservation of social networks. It is very common for the conversations to dwell on family issues, marriages, divorces, births and deaths. The gossip network keeps all members well informed on the comings and goings of other individuals. These networks continue to play an important role today, even though virtual communication through WhatsApp, Facebook and other social media has become increasingly common.

The knowledge of practical skills was traditionally passed on from generation to generation. Among the pastoralists, animal husbandry, especially of camels, sheep and goats, but also other animals, such as horses, hawks and dogs, was an active skill. It ranged from the knowledge of good pastures and water sources, breeding, tending and medicating animals, to the utilization and processing of products, such as milk, meat and hair. The intricate knowledge of survival in the harsh conditions of the steppe and desert also included other skills: use of local products as medicine, identifying the flora and fauna, knowledge of tribal areas, warfare, handcrafts, as well as reading signs of nature, weather and sky. For the semi-sedentary pastoralists, the local conditions and agriculture also formed part of their knowledge.

All these three elements contain what the Bedouin call *ādāt wa-taqālīd*, meaning customs and traditions. These include all the (moral) values, knowledge and practices that makes the Bedouin identity, assures the continuation, and maintains the life. The behavior and interaction between genders are based on four values: honor, decency, dignity and respect (Al-Sekhaneh 2005, 176). As long as they exist, the Bedouin identity also exists.

The Bedouin, like other traditional societies, have been affected by modernization and globalization. The surrounding communities have always had very polarized attitudes towards the Bedouin. As a result, several authorities, from the Ottomans to the colonialist powers, and finally to modern Middle Eastern countries, have taken very identical approaches on the “Bedouin issue”: to sedentarize the Bedouin and modernize them in the process. The results have not always been successful. Jordan, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are examples of countries where the Bedouin have had greater

influence in the formation of the society. The national identity in these countries has largely been built on the Bedouin culture and heritage.

Today, only a small fraction of the Bedouin population continues the nomadic life, and a larger number are balancing their lives between the old and the new. “Bedouin”, therefore, should be considered a social identity. Many sedentarized tribes would not use the word “Bedouin” anymore, but would still define themselves as “‘Arab”, or “tribal” (‘ashā’iri). With urban life, the modern technologies, transportation, healthcare, education and new professions and entrepreneurship opportunities have become increasingly available, and the Bedouin have been trying to adapt to these changes.

## **Jordan**

Throughout modern history, the societies of Transjordan have been predominantly tribal. In addition to the nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin, even the rural communities formed tribal networks and affiliations. The Hashemite royal family, itself a branch of the Quraysh tribe, has sought the support and allegiance of the tribes since the Great Arab Revolt (Rowland 2009, 12). During the British Mandate period, the tribes were tightly integrated into the state, and the public offices were predominantly staffed by tribal citizens. The Jordanian army continues to be mostly tribal, its soldiers coming especially from the southern Huwaytat, but also from Bani Sakhr, Sirhan, Shammar and Bani Hassan (Al-Sekhane 2005). Because of this, Jordan is usually described as a tribal nation-state ruled by a tribal leadership and dominated by tribal affiliations and loyalties.


When Transjordan was established in 1923, the number of inhabitants in the country was around 250,000, 125,000 of which were nomadic or semi-nomadic Bedouins, and 125,000 living in villages and towns (Ghawanmeh, 1982). Since then, several waves of refugees, first from Palestine, later from Iraq, and finally from Syria, has shifted the balance between tribal and non-tribal population. Despite becoming the minority, the tribal society continues to play an important role in the politics and culture of Jordan. While the Palestinians and later refugees focused on building and expanding the private sector, the public sector continues to be the main employer of the Bedouin.

Bani Khalid is one of the large, transnational tribal confederations, alongside Shammar and ‘Aneza. The total number of members of the tribe is unknown, as no official figures exist. When inquired, informants in Jordan and Lebanon tried giving rough estimates, stating that the number is “probably more than one million”. This, however, is very likely an underestimate. Today, branches of the Bani Khalid are present in most Middle Eastern countries: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt. The majority of the subtribes are Sunni Muslim, but Shia families also exist. This study focuses on the Sunni branches of the tribe.

The origin story of the tribe is closely connected to Khalid ibn al-Walid, the companion of Prophet Muhammad, and one of the great military leaders of the Islamic conquest. In northern Jordan and Lebanon his victory over the Byzantine army in the Battle of Yarmouk (AD 636) is often mentioned in the informal interview situations. His tomb is located in modern Homs, in Syria. While many of the interviewed mention that he probably is not the actual ancestor and founder of the tribe, he continues to be an important figure in the tribe’s oral history.

The movements of the Bani Khalid tribe can be traced through historical documents. During the 15<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries, the tribe’s center of power was along the eastern coastal region of the Arabian Peninsula, east of the modern city of Riyadh. After expelling the Ottomans from the region in 1670, the capital of the Khalidi emirate was established in Al-Mubarraz. During this time, the tribe was also able to extend its control inland to the Nejd region. Their rule ended with the Saudi campaigns.

By 1793 Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Prince Muhammad bin Sa’ud had conquered the land controlled by Bani Khalid tribe. Unrest, tribal warfare and uprisings continued throughout the following century, but although Bani Khalid were able to gain some power temporarily, many members of the tribe had started migrating further north to avoid the clashes with the Saudi forces. Thus, the tribe settled into areas in the north, and by the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was already well established in Syria. Before the establishment of modern state borders, the tribe’s migrations extended from the Syrian Desert in the east to the Bekaa Valley and Golan Heights in the west.



**MAP : BANI KHALID IN BILAD AL-SHAM**  
(ACCORDING TO AL-SEKHANEH, 2005).

## Syria

While nomadic pastoralists have had a strong presence in the “Bilad al-Sham” for centuries, their areas of control have often been determined by the presence or absence of a strong central authority. When the Ottoman Empire took control of northern Arabia in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the resulting agricultural expansion pushed the mobile camel-herders out of the more fertile regions, while the shepherders remained in the fringes of the agricultural lands. These tribes include Mawali, Hadidiyin and Fadl, among others. They also began paying taxes to Ottoman governors and became more integrated in the local society. Many sons of the tribal leaders were educated in Istanbul and became prominent figures in local politics (Chatty 2010, 32).

At times when the central government became weaker, the nomadic tribal groups would return to the marginal zones. One such period took place in the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century, when the tribal confederations of Bani Khalid, Shammar and ‘Aneza began their

expansion north as the result of the campaign of Al Sa’ud and the creation of the first Saudi state. Migrating across Bilad al-Sham, they became a prominent presence in the region.

In the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman Empire changed the approach towards pastoralists and nomads. In Syria, this led to rapid changes in the Bedouin lifestyle and economy. The land that had been used for grazing for the flocks was transferred into agricultural land, which forced the Bedouin to combine pastoralism with farming. The French mandate in turn actively made efforts to diminish the power of the tribes in the region. Naturally, the establishment of new nation-state boundaries had a deep effect on the Bedouin whose ancient *dīras*, meaning migration areas, did not in any way coincide with the new borders. As a result, many Bedouin challenged the authorities and rejected the whole notion of citizenship. The tribes in the east of the country remained in the margins geographically, politically and economically. They had the right to bear arms and settle legal matters amongst themselves using the old tribal system. They kept their mobile lifestyle, which enforced strong ties with families living in the Arabian Peninsula and allowed the tribes to move out of the region in turbulent times. Such movement took place after 1958 when the union between Egypt and Syria was established. This led to a major reform where the tribes ceased to have any separate rights within the state. Even after the short-lived union, the Ba’ath party’s plans of modernization did not view the tribal elements positively.

Severe drought in the 1958-1961 period resulted in the death of 80% of camels and nearly half of sheep in Syria. Many families who lost their whole income during these years took the opportunity offered by the state, settled down and became farmers (Chatty 2010, 40). This shift away from the nomadic and semi-sedentary pastoralism continued during the next decades. The Bani Khalid settled in the areas of Homs and Hama governorates and in southern Deraa. While some members of the tribe maintained a partial semi-nomadic life, a majority became sedentary farmers owning fields and cows. The tribal *sheikhs* of the Syrian Bani Khalid, Sheikh Talal Al-Basha, Sheikh Ahmad Hussein and Sheikh Al-Walid Abdelkader still live in Homs.

As Hafez al-Assad rose to power, he sought the support and aid of the tribes to consolidate his regime. The tribes were involved in suppressing the

uprising in Hama in 1982, and even after that, the tribes located between Hama and Aleppo, especially Hadidiyin, were used as information sources by state intelligence services (Chatty 2010, 47). Bedouin were also nominated to high positions, including ministries of interior and agriculture. However, this system of clientelism benefitted only the *sheikhs* and parts of the tribal society while leaving the majority in margins and poverty (Dukhan 2014, 5; Khaddour & Mazur 2017, 6). With this in mind, it is easy to understand how part of the tribes have supported the regime, while others have joined the opposition or ISIS, thus leaving the whole tribal fabric fragmented and unorganized. Bani Khalid was split in their allegiance, but a majority of Bani Khalid fighters joined the opposition and have been fighting mainly in the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and in the Front of Syrian Revolutionaries (Heras & O'Leary 2013). The tribal networks across the borders were very likely used in acquiring weapons and artillery, especially during the times when FSA controlled areas around Deraa and West of Homs (Naffee 2012, Dukhan 2014,15). In the meantime, the tribal ties to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar continue to affect the political support networks of the region.

## Lebanon

In the region of modern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley has been known as the late summer and early spring grazing territory for pastoralists, and accounts of Bedouin presence can be found already from the 13<sup>th</sup> century accounts (Chatty 2011, 23). Before the creation of the modern borders, the Bedouin tribes had winter pastures extending east of Homs towards the Syrian Desert. In the early spring, the flocks would be taken to the high mountain pastures, and during the summer months, the families would stay in the Bekaa agricultural areas. The ancient system, where the flocks were led to the fields after the harvest, to feed on the stubs and fertilize the soil, represents often overlooked interdependencies and ties between the desert and the sown (Joseph 2013, 23-24).

The 1932 census – the only proper population census conducted in Lebanon throughout its modern history – left many of the Bedouin stateless. This is partly due to the tribes not being present in the country at the time of the census. In 1958 a “*qayd al-dars*” -status was given to Bedouin who had not registered in the census, and in 1994, they were granted Lebanese nationality. About 10-15% of Lebanon's stateless

Bedouin were also granted *qayd al-dars* in 1994. However, this was a personal status and could not be passed on to children. As a result, approximately two-thirds of the estimated 150,000 Bedouin in Lebanon are still without nationality. They lack access to healthcare and education, and encounter obstacles in daily life, from finding jobs to purchasing lands. A majority of the Bedouin tribes live in the Bekaa Valley, most in permanent housing, are working in agriculture. For example, Al-Fadl from northern Syria settled in the Bekaa after they were driven out by the Mawali. In Lebanon, the tribe has split into two branches, Hruk and Fa'ur. The *sheikh* of Fa'ur was able to purchase land in the Anti-Lebanon region for his tribe to live in. Many of the Bedouin settlements, however, are not formally recognized, thus lacking basic public services and economic opportunities (Chatty 2011, 26).

## APPENDIX B: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS IN JORDAN

<b>Id</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Tribe</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Marital status</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Housing in refuge</b>
1	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Primary	55	With relatives
2	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Middle School	24	Rented house
3	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	BA	30	Rented house
4	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	BA	25	Rented house
5	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Secondary	32	With relatives
6	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Secondary	18	Self-built hut
7	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	34	Rented tent
8	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	72	Rented tent
9	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	24	Self-built hut
10	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	37	With relatives
11	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	35	Rented house
12	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	32	Rented house
13	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	40	With relatives
14	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	55	Rented house
15	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	67	Self-built hut
16	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	49	Rented house
17	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	None	24	Rented house
18	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	54	Rented house
19	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	40	With relatives
20	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	49	Rented house
21	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Literate	94	Self-built hut
22	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Widow	Middle School	39	Rented house
23	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Primary	34	Rented house
24	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Primary	35	Tent
25	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Middle School	24	Rented house
26	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	None	56	Rented house
27	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	None	76	Rented house
28	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	None	60	Rented house
29	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	BA	54	Self-built hut
30	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Secondary	20	Rented house
31	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Secondary	33	Self-built hut
32	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Diploma	35	Rented house
33	Syrian	Other	Male	Single	Primary	18	Rented tent
34	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	None	20	Rented house
35	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	Secondary	50	Rented house
36	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	BA	34	Rented house
37	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	Literate	90	Rented house

<b>Id</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Tribe</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Marital status</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Housing in refuge</b>
38	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	Literate	67	Rented house
39	Syrian	Other	Female	Widow	None	65	Rented house
40	Syrian	Other	Female	Widow	None	65	Rented house
41	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	Primary	40	Rented house
42	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	Primary	43	Rented house
43	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	Middle School	28	Rented house
44	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	Middle School	30	Rented house
45	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	Middle School	28	Rented house
46	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	None	60	Self-built hut
47	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	None	60	Rented house
48	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	Secondary	29	Rented house
49	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Middle School	30	N/A
50	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	BA	25	N/A
51	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	BA	29	N/A
52	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	BA	28	N/A
53	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	BA	29	N/A
54	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	BA	28	N/A
55	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	BA	22	N/A
56	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Secondary	20	N/A
57	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Secondary	23	N/A
58	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Secondary	33	N/A
59	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Secondary	21	N/A
60	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Secondary	37	N/A
61	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Secondary	26	N/A
62	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Secondary	25	N/A
63	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	MA	29	N/A
64	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	50	N/A
<b>Id</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Tribe</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Marital status</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Housing in refuge</b>
65	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	50	N/A
66	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	64	N/A
67	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	31	N/A
68	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	31	N/A
69	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	39	N/A
70	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Middle School	65	N/A
71	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	None	71	N/A
72	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	BA	59	N/A
73	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	BA	46	N/A
74	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	40	N/A
75	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	50	N/A
76	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	45	N/A
77	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	28	N/A
78	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	50	N/A

<b>Id</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Tribe</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Marital status</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Housing in refuge</b>
79	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	41	N/A
80	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	37	N/A
81	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	37	N/A
82	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	50	N/A
83	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	50	N/A
84	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	PhD	60	N/A
85	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Diploma	49	N/A
86	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Literate	70	N/A
87	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	N/A	67	N/A
88	Jordanian	Other	Female	Married	Middle School	39	N/A
89	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Primary	37	N/A
90	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Middle School	30	N/A
91	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	None	60	N/A
92	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	None	60	N/A
93	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	BA	53	N/A
94	Jordanian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Literate	51	N/A

## APPENDIX C: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS IN LEBANON

<b>Id</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Tribe</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Marital status</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Age groups</b>	<b>Housing type while in refuge</b>	<b>Area</b>	<b>Main sources of income in Lebanon</b>
95	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	None	E	Rented house	Tripoli	Aid, children
96	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	None	E	Rented house	Tripoli	Aid, children
97	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	MA	Rented house	Tripoli	Aid, vegetable cart
98	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	MA	Rented house	Tripoli	Aid, construction work
99	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	None	E	Tent, rental land	Aakkar	Children (greenhouses)
100	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	A	Tent, rental land	Tripoli	Factory work
101	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	A	Tent, rental land	Tripoli	Factory work
102	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	A	Tent, rental land	Tripoli	Factory work
103	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	A	Tent, rental land	Tripoli	Factory work
104	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Single	Secondary	A	Tent, rental land	Tripoli	Factory work
105	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	A	Tent, rental land	Aakkar	Greenhouses
106	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Diploma	A	Tent, rental land	Aakkar	Greenhouses
107	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	A	Tent, rental land	Aakkar	Greenhouses
108	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Secondary	A	Tent, rental land	Aakkar	Greenhouses
109	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Primary	A	Tent, rental land	Aakkar	Greenhouses
110	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	None	E	Rented house	Tripoli	Aid, children
111	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	None	E	Tent, rental land	Aakkar	Children (greenhouses)
112	Syrian	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Primary	A	Tent, rental land	Tripoli	Spouse (factory work)
113	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	Primary	MA	Tent	Wadi Khalid	Livestock
114	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	University studies	A	Rented house	Wadi Khalid	Selling juice
115	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	Secondary	MA	Rented house	Wadi Khalid	Grocery store
116	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	Primary	A	Rented house	Wadi Khalid	Grocery store

<b>Id</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Tribe</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Marital status</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Age groups</b>	<b>Housing type while in refuge</b>	<b>Area</b>	<b>Main sources of income in Lebanon</b>
117	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	Secondary	A	Tent, rental land	Wadi Khalid	Grocery store
118	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	Primary	A	Tent	Wadi Khalid	Livestock
119	Syrian	Other	Male	Married	Secondary	MA	Tent	Wadi Khalid	Agriculture
120	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	None	MA	Tent, charity	Aakkar	Aid, agriculture
121	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	Primary	MA	Tent, charity	Wadi Khalid	Aid, charity, livestock
122	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	Primary	A	Tent, charity	Wadi Khalid	Sewing clothes
123	Syrian	Other	Female	Married	Primary	A	Tent	Wadi khalid	Livestock
124	Syrian	Other	Female	Widow	None	A	House, charity	Wadi Khalid	Tending private garden
125	Lebanese	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	None	E	N/A	Wadi Khalid	Agriculture, livestock
126	Lebanese	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	A	N/A	Wadi Khalid	Agriculture, livestock
127	Lebanese	Bani Khalid	Male	Married	Primary	MA	N/A	Wadi Khalid	Agriculture, livestock
<b>Id</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Tribe</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Marital status</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Age groups</b>	<b>Housing type while in refuge</b>	<b>Area</b>	<b>Main sources of income in Lebanon</b>
128	Lebanese	Other	Male	Married	Secondary	MA	N/A	Wadi Khalid	Business, investment
129	Lebanese	Other	Male	Married	Secondary	MA	N/A	Tripoli	Business, investment
130	Lebanese	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	Primary	A	N/A	Wadi Khalid	Agriculture, livestock
131	Lebanese	Bani Khalid	Female	Married	None	MA	N/A	Wadi Khalid	Agriculture, livestock
132	Lebanese	Other	Female	Married	Secondary	A	N/A	Wadi Khalid	Spouse
133	Lebanese	Other	Female	Married	Secondary	A	N/A	Wadi Khalid	Spouse
134	Lebanese	Other	Female	Single	BA	A	N/A	Wadi Khalid	Parents (Student)
135	Lebanese	Other	Female	Single	Secondary	Y	N/A	Wadi Khalid	Parents (Student)
136	Lebanese	Other	Female	Single	Secondary	Y	N/A	Wadi Khalid	Parents (Student)
137	Lebanese	None	Male					Aakkar	NGO-worker
138	German	None	Male					Aakkar	NGO-worker





# ABOUT THE PROGRAM

## *The Refugee Research and Policy Program*

*Lebanon and the Arab region are facing one of the largest refugee crises spawning serious public policy challenges. Given this context, the Refugee Research and Policy program generates refugee related/policy-oriented research that addresses an existing knowledge gap in the field of refugee studies. Moreover, the program seeks to enrich the quality of debate among scholars, officials, international organizations, and civil society actors, with the aim to inform policymaking relating to refugees in the Middle East and beyond.*

# ABOUT THE ISSAM FARES INSTITUTE

*The Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI) at the American University of Beirut (AUB) is an independent, research-based, policy oriented institute. It aims to initiate and develop policy-relevant research in and about the Arab region.*

*The Institute is committed to expanding and deepening knowledge production and to creating a space for the interdisciplinary exchange of ideas among researchers, civil society actors, and policy makers.*

## **IFI goals:**

- . Enhancing and broadening public policy-related debate and knowledge production in the Arab world and beyond;*
- . Better understanding the Arab world within shifting international and global contexts;*
- . Providing a space to enrich the quality of interaction among scholars, officials and civil society actors in and about the Arab world;*
- . Disseminating knowledge that is accessible to policy-makers, media, research communities and the general public.*

